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Abstract—Securing critical systems such as Cyber-Physical
Systems (CPS) is an important feature especially when it comes
to critical transmitted data in a real-time environment. At the
same time, the implementation of security counter-measures in
such systems may impact transmission delays of critical tasks.
For this reason selecting proper security mechanisms in such
critical systems is an important issue. In this context, we propose
a model-based approach for selecting proper security solution
alternatives composed of security patterns at early design stage
against real-time requirements. We provide a generalizable and
tool-supported solution to support the approach using UML and
its profiles. A validation of the work is presented via a simplified
version of SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition)
system case study.
Keywords-Real-time, Security patterns, Schedulability analysis,
Model-Driven Engineering (MDE).
I. INTRODUCTION
Our society has become more dependent on software-
intensive systems, such as Information and Communication
Technologies (ICTs) systems, not only in safety-critical areas
but also in areas such as finance, medical information man-
agement and systems using web applications. The complexity
of such systems during their design comes from the involve-
ment of transdisciplinary concerns. Indeed, such systems must
satisfy a number of requirements (real-time, physical, energy
efficiency and others). In addition, these systems have to sat-
isfy assurance requirements (e.g., IEC 61508 and ISO 27005
[1], for dependability and security concerns). This brings the
complexity of such systems to a higher level. In particular,
security concerns have an impact on other concerns such as
real-time performance. Therefore, architects must apply trade-
offs to satisfy functional requirements (real-time), and security
requirements as two categories of constraints.
Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE) provides a use-
ful contribution for the design and evaluation of secure sys-
tems. It makes easier the enactment of the separation of
concern paradigm (security, real-time, performance, etc.). It
helps the architect specify in a separate view non-functional
requirements such as security at a high level of abstraction.
Moreover, expertise and knowledge in system architecture and
security can be captured within patterns that provide generic
solutions for recurring problems. In particular for security,
where protecting data and services is an important issue,
security pattern catalogs [2] provide guidelines to build secure
architectures.
This work is part of a more general process devoted to incre-
mental pattern-based modeling and safety and security analysis
for correct by construction systems design. In previous works,
we have proposed a model-based approach for guiding the
selection of security patterns based on risk analysis and
pattern classification [3]. More recently in [4], we proposed
an approach to support Security, Dependability and Resource
Trade-offs using Pattern-based Development and Model-driven
Engineering. In this paper, we go one step further, we study
the impact of implementation alternatives of these security
solutions onto the system architecture. A special emphasis is
paid to timing performance concerns using model-based real-
time evaluations. In this context, the system architect starts
from a functional architecture and an abstract platform. The
artifacts are abstract at this stage of development but con-
tain temporal information (e.g., computation cost, deadlines
and period of event for each function). Once the security
requirements are specified, several security pattern solutions
are proposed from a repository of patterns. The real-time
evaluation helps the architect to select the best candidates that
respect timing concerns (e.g., maximum utilization capacity
in the platform). An evaluation of the proposed approach is
presented through its practical application on a SCADA system
case study, which has strong security requirements, to support
a pattern-based development approach.
The remaining sections are organized as follows: Section II
presents a global picture of the positioning of this work.
Section III presents the main steps of the real-time evaluation
approach of security solution alternatives. Section IV presents
the model-based framework with the used modeling languages,
the model transformations and the tool support. Section V dis-
cusses the obtained experimental results applied to a SCADA
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system case study.
Section VI positions the paper towards related works and
section VII concludes the paper and discusses future work.
II. BACKGROUND
The general approach consists of building secure soft-
ware and systems at high level design stage using patterns
as its primary technique: Patten Based System Engineering
(PBSE) [5], [6]. Fig. 1 shows an excerpt of the approach
which consists of three collaborative processes: architecture
design, risk management and pattern solution. At the archi-
tecture design process, first a conceptual model of the system
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Figure 1. Architecture design with risk analysis and pattern use
is designed (A1) then the system architecture is designed
describing the functions of the system (A2). In parallel, in the
risk management process, the system architecture is submitted
to risk analysis in order to enumerate threats (A3) which
are treated to derive security requirements (A4). This process
is done by a security risk analyst. Security requirements
describe what should be provided by security mechanisms in
order to stop some threats. They do not deal with how they
are implemented. The search of solution patterns relies on
SEMCO [7] which provides two levels of descriptions: abstract
and concrete. At the pattern solution process, abstract patterns
are selected according to security requirements. When dealing
with implementation, concrete patterns i.e., refinements of
abstract patterns, are selected according to hardware/software
resource constraints (A5). Pattern integration (A6) consists on
applying the identified patterns on the system architecture.
There may be several sets of security patterns. In this paper
we focus on activity (A5).
III. SCHEDULABILITY ANALYSIS OF SECURITY PATTERN
CONFIGURATIONS
A. Methodology description
In this section we present an overview of the proposed
methodology in Fig. 2. The main objective of the workflow
is to support real-time evaluation of various possible security
pattern configurations that we will call “security solution
alternatives" to assess their soundness regarding real-time
constraints. This seamless process relies on three main kinds
of artifacts: (1) functional architectures to describe system
and software functions, and (2) security patterns to describe
system security solutions and (3) platform models to describe
hardware resources. These concepts have been defined in [4].
As described in Fig. 2, during the first step, the architect first
provides the functional architecture specification model of the
real-time system together with a security pattern configuration
model. The functional specification contains timing parame-
ters: end-to-end flow deadlines, function execution time bud-
gets, activation event patterns (periodic, aperiodic, sporadic).
A security patterns configuration is a subset of a system of
patterns composed of a list of security patterns and a list of
relationships between these security patterns. It will be used
to specify one possible structure of an application based on
security patterns which will be deployed on a platform [4].
Next, the designer identifies the merge points as prerequisite
to establish bindings (represented as dashed arrows in Fig. 2).
These two models accompanied with the bindings are used as
inputs to the “Pattern Configuration Integration” (Step 2). The
output is a refined functional architecture specification with
added security patterns functions. Step 3 is responsible for the
creation of task model based on on the functional architecture,
the platform specification and the mappings between them.
Using the resulting task model, schedulability analysis with
offset-based scheduling [8] is performed (Step 4). If the task
model is schedulable then the pattern configuration is added to
the set of candidates (Step 5). Otherwise, the architect rejects
this configuration and continues evaluating another one. The
next sections describe the used algorithms for each step.
B. Pattern configuration integration
Bindings are necessary for linking functions in the func-
tional architecture to those in the pattern. Let Ma be a
functional architecture specification, C a pattern configuration
and B the bindings between them. To define the refined
functional architecture obtained by integration, we define the
algorithm in Listing 2 called IntegratePatternConfiguration.
1 Algor i t hm I n t e g r a t e P a t t e r n C o n f i g u r a t i o n
2 I n p u t : Ma, C , B .
3 Outpu t : Mac .
4 f o r each P a t t e r n i n t h e C do
5 f o r each b i i n B do
6 i f b i . p a t t e r n F u n c t i o n . p a t t e r n = P a t t e r n
7 s u b s t i t u t e (Mac , b i . a p p l i c a t i o n F u n c t i o n , b i .
p a t t e r n F u n c t i o n )
8 s ave ( )
9 e n d i f
10 end f o r
11 end f o r
Listing 1. Pattern Configuration integration algorithm
The pattern configuration and the set of bindings are parsed
and for each pattern in the configuration, equal bindings
(originating from a function owned by the pattern) are looked
up (line 4-6). The integration is then proceeded by substituting
the targeted function by the binding i.e., application function
(bi.applicationFunction) with the source of the binding i.e.,
pattern function (bi.patternFunction) (line 7-8). In our case,
the integration process is a merge. A more comprehensive
integration method has been studied in [9].
C. Task model generation
The generation process starts by eliciting all end-to-end
flows in the functional architecture. An end-to-end flow is
a set of communicating function from one end to the other.
For example, in Fig. 2, there are two possible end-to-end
flows: “E1” and “E2”. Each each end-to-end flow in the
Figure 2. Schedulability analysis of security pattern configuration
functional architecture is a potential task if and only if all the
functions are allocated in the same platform node. Otherwise,
each set of communicating functions in the end-to-end flow
allocated in the same node are assigned to one task. There
is a chance that functions can shared between several tasks,
in this case the function can only be called by one task
and this adds a blockage time. In Fig. 2, in end-to-end flow
“E1”, functions (“f1”,“f1+F2”)/(“F3”,“f3+F2”) are allocated in
nodes “N1”/“N2” respectively. Thus two set of functions are
assigned to two different tasks “T1” and “T2”. Note, however,
it is possible to integrate other task model techniques such as
those dealing with optimization [10].
D. Real-time evaluation of pattern configurations
Let M be a set of type Mac (i.e., the set of functional
architecture specification obtained by integration a pattern
configuration) and T of type TMac (i.e., the set of task models
for each architecture in Mac. To define the set of schedulable
architecture configurations M, we define the algorithm defined
in Listing 2 called EvaluateArchitectureConfiguration.
1 Algor i t hm E v a l u a t eA r c h i t e c t u r e C o n f i g u r a t i o n
2 I n p u t : T .
3 Outpu t : M.
4 f o r each TMac i n T do
5 s c h e d u l a b i l i t y A n a l y s i s (T ) ;
6 i f T . i s S c h e d u l a b l e
7 M:= M U TMac .Mac
8 s ave ( )
9 e n d i f
10 end f o r
Listing 2. Real-time evaluation of pattern configurations algorithm
T is parsed and each task model TMac is submitted to
schedulability analysis. If the TMac passes the test then it is
added to M. Otherwise it is rejected.
IV. MODEL-BASED DEVELOPMENT
In this section we describe an MDE framework to sup-
port the previous approach. We use metamodeling, existing
modeling languages and model transformation techniques for
the specification and analysis of secure system and software
architecture. However, the approach does not prescribe a
fixed set of metamodels and model transformations to be
used. As mentioned earlier, here we only focuses on security
requirements that directly influence timing constraints.
A. A Metamodel for S&D patterns (SEPM)
The System and Software Engineering Pattern Metamodel
(SEPM) [11] is a metamodel for describing Security and
Dependability (S&D) patterns, and constitutes the base of
our pattern modeling language. Here we consider patterns as
sub-systems that expose services (via interfaces) and manage
S&D and Resource properties (via features) yielding a unified
way to capture meta-information related to a pattern and its
context of use. The following paragraph details the principal
concepts of the SEPM metamodel to specify an S&D pattern,
as described with Ecore notations in Fig. 3.
• SepmPattern. This block represents a security pattern as a
subsystem describing a solution for a security particular
recurring design problem that arises in specific design
context.
SepmPattern
publisher_identity : EString
origin : EString
also_known_as : EString
consequences : EString
problem : EString
context : EString
examples : EString
SepmInternalStructure
SepmDocument
uri : EString
kind : SepmArtefactKind = InternalStructure
SepmKeyWord
name : EString
SepmExternalInterface
SepmProperty
GprmProperty
computable : EBoolean = false
SepmParticipant
SeArtefact
SeReference SeReferenceKind
name : EString
SeReferenceKindLibrary
SepmSystemOfPatterns
[0..*] solutions
[0..*] attachedDocuments
[1..*] keywords
[0..*] externalInterfaces
[0..*] properties
[0..*] sepmparticipant
[0..*] sepmparticipant
[0..*] sepmparticipant
[0..*] sepmexternalinterface
[0..*] sepmparticipant
[1..1] source
[1..1] target
[1..1] referenceKind
[0..*] items
[0..*] references
[0..*] patterns
Figure 3. The (simplified) SEPM Metamodel
• SepmExternalInterface. A SepmPattern interacts with its
environment with Interfaces.
• SepmProperty. A property denotes a particular character-
istic of a pattern related to the concern it is dealing with
and dedicated to capture its intent in a certain way. For
instance, security and dependability properties (SnDProp-
erty)and resource properties (ResourceProperty).
• SepmInternStructure. This constitutes the implementation
of the solution proposed by the pattern. How the partici-
pants collaborate to carry out their responsibilities for the
realization of the solution.
• SepmParticipant. A listing of the component used in the
pattern and their responsabilities in the design. In our
context, a participant is a component type with a security-
specific purpose. It’s role is to add new functionality to
the system that is specific to a security requirement the
system should uphold. In the context of this study, we
use the term Function to refer to this concept.
• SepmSystemOfPatterns. A pattern system is a set of
individual pattern with their relationships (References).
Thus dependencies between specific problems can be
considered in a comprehensive way.
• SeReference. This link is used to specify the relationship
between patterns with regard to the domain and software
lifecycle stage in the form of a pattern language. For
example, a pattern at a certain software lifecycle stage
uses another pattern at the same or at a different software
lifecycle stage. SeReferenceKind contains examples of
these links. Here, we create the SeReferenceKind model
library to support the specification of relationships across
artifacts (e.g., refines, specializes and uses) as an exten-
sion of the relationship classification proposed in [12].
– refines. It is used to represent the refinement relation-
ship between two patterns.
– specializes. It is used to represent the specialization
relationship (detail).
– uses. It is used to represent the functional dependency
relationship between two patterns.
– isSimilar. It allows to link two patterns that perform
the same functionality. This link is often used to link
software patterns to their equivalent hardware patterns.
– isAnAlternative. It allows to link tow patterns that solve
the same problem, but propose different solutions.
Example. We illustrate the usage of the SEPM for specifying
a pattern with the example of secure communication pattern
based on SSL1 mechanism. Here, we specify an S&D property:
“authenticity of sender and receiver”. To type the category of
this property we use a category from the earlier defined in
the S&D category library: Authenticity. Moreover, we identify
some resource properties, such as “CPU resource time for
encryption” and “CPU resource time for authentication” that
belong to category CPUTime, and “extra energy cost for
encryption” and “extra energy cost for authentication” that
belong to category PowerConsumption.
B. UML + MARTE
The functional architecture and platform are modeled using
UML language [13]. In addition, we use a subset of MARTE
profile to annotate the models. MARTE standard [14] provides
concepts for the modeling and analysis of real-time embedded
systems (RTES) and CPSs. Table I shows the used concepts.
MARTE Stereotype UML extension
Functional architecture stereotypes
GQAM::GaWorkloadBehavior Activity
GQAM::GaWorkloadEvent AcceptEventAction
SAM:: SaEndToEndFlow ActivityPartition
SAM::SaStep CallActionBehavior
Alloc::Allocate Abstraction
Alloc::Allocated CallAction, Property
Platform Stereotypes
GQAM::GaPlatformResources Class
SAM::SaExecHost Property
SAM ::SaCommHost Connector
SAM::SaSharedResource Property
GRM::SchedulableResource Property
Table I
MARTE ANNOTATIONS
C. M2M transformation: SEPM to UML+MARTE
1) Pattern instantiation: Patterns need to be instantiated
from the model-based repository SEMCO described in SEPM
into the UML-based development environment. For this pur-
pose, Table II shows transformation rules using the source
Metamodel (SEPM) and the target Metamodel (UML) with
MARTE annotations.
1The TLS Protocol Version 1.2. rfc5246, 2008.
2) Pattern integration: Once the instantiation of a security
pattern configuration is done, patterns need to integrated into
the functional architecture. This is done with model merge
techniques. Now that all the models are in the UML-based
modeling environment, the functional architecture together
with the security pattern models are composed of a set
of UML::Property annotated with SAM::SaStep representing
functions. These elements contain the value of their execution
time. Once the bindings between the architecture and the
security pattern configuration are done; the transformation
rules add to the linked architecture functions the value of
the execution time of the related security pattern functions.
It also adds new functions introduced with the patterns. A
new architecture configuration is obtained.
Source Target
SEPM UML MARTE
annotations
and types
Comments
SepmPattern Package N/A This package is the
main container
Context Comment N/A The textual descrip-
tion is put in this
comment inside the
UML package
Problem Comment N/A —
SepmInternalStructure Class N/A The class describes
the functional
architecture of the
pattern and contains
functions
Function Property SAM::SaStep The functions are
put inside the
container class. Each
SEPM::Function has
a S&D property
and/or a resource
property
ResourceProperty Class NFP_Real This mapping
depends on the
resource property
category and thus
the target is one
of the sub types
of NFP_Real.
E.g., “CPUTime”
property is mapped to
NFP_Duration (sub-
type of NFP_real).
Table II
M2M TRANSFORMATION RULES FROM SEPM TO UML+MARTE
D. Modeling process
The modeling process follows the steps described in [15]
based on MARTE. The goal is to build a task model from the
design in order to evaluate and compare architectural solutions.
We describe here the main modeling steps and position them
with regards to steps 2, 3 and 4 in Fig. 2.
The input is a functional view of the application obtained
by integration a security pattern configuration using UML and
MARTE annotations (result of step 2 in Fig. 2). A task model
Figure 4. Using MARTE to set timing constraints
is obtained following four steps: (1) identification of event-
chains in the functional model and (2) specification of timing
constraints (step 3 in Fig. 2), and (3) computation of a MARTE
task model and (4) task model allocation (step 4 in Fig. 2).
The workflow and MARTE notations used are summarized in
Fig. 4.
• Event chains identification. The functional organization
of the application is described in a Composite diagram
showing functions and their connections. From this global
view several timing views corresponding to end-to-end
flows are selected.
• Timing constraints setup. Selected event chains are then
tagged to setup timing constraints. MARTE annotations
are added to these diagrams to set: (1) event chains timing
constraints (between 2 ports), (2) execution time con-
straints on functions (actually expected for the behavior
implementing the function).
• Task model setup. The task model structure is described
using activity diagrams and can be directly obtained from
the event chains specifications above. Each of them is
translated into a MARTE end-to-end event flow. Each
flow is activated by the reception of an event and de-
scribed by the consequent behaviors implementing the
various functions traversal connected through connectors.
MARTE annotations are used to: (1) characterize a timing
configuration, (2) specify a data arrival pattern for the ac-
tivating event (workflowEvent) and (3) specify constraints
on the different steps (behaviors involved in the event
flow).
• Allocation model setup. Finally an allocation model is
described in a composite diagram that shows the alloca-
tion between functions (actually the tasks corresponding
to their behaviors) onto a platform model. MARTE anno-
tations are used to: (1) set allocation relations and (2) set
hardware architecture characteristics on execution hosts
and communication channels.
E. Design and analysis tools
As discussed below, the proposed tool chain is designed to
support the proposed metamodels and model-transformations.
Appropriate tools for supporting the approach must fulfill the
following key requirements:
• Enable the creation of the UML models used to describe
system and software architecture.
• Allow the creation of a custom UML profile.
• Support the implementation of a repository to store
pattern models and the related model libraries for classi-
fication and relationships.
• Enable the creation of visualizations of the repository to
facilitate its access.
• Support the access to the repository. Create views on the
repository according to its APIs, its organization and the
needs of the targeted system engineering process. For
instance, a keyword-based search access tool is provide
within the semcomdt suite.
• Enable transformations of the pattern models from the
repository format into the target-modeling environment
(Papyrus pattern format).
• Enable the creation of system of pattern models in the
target-modeling environment.
• Enable the creation of pattern configuration models in the
target-modeling environment.
• Enable the integration of application models and models
imported from the repository.
• Support the calculation of resource consumption and real-
time scheduling.
• Provide the ability to create customized reports by query-
ing the resulting models.
Amongst the existing alternatives, we have chosen Papyrus
UML 2. Specifically, we used Papyrus to create the UML
diagrams for the model of the application. SEMCOMDT
3(SEMCO Model Development Tools, IRIT’s editor and plat-
form plugins) is used to support pattern repository. The
generation of pattern system configuration from a pattern
system has been described in [4]. The MARTE UML profile is
already integrated into Papyrus. Only stereotypes described in
section IV-B are used. The model transformation to support:
(1) the instantiation of the patterns form the model-based
repository SEMCO into the modeling environment; and (2)
the integration of the patterns in the architecture are imple-
mented using QVT Operational language 4. Real-time analysis
2https://eclipse.org/papyrus/
3http://www.semcomdt.org
4https://projects.eclipse.org/projects/modeling.mmt.qvt-oml
have been performed using under development tool called
“Qompass Architect” [16]. It is a model-based tool developed
in CEA LIST for QoS assessment and optimization of real-
time architectures. Qompass Architect explores non-functional
properties of real-time architectures to finally synthesize an op-
timized architecture. Note that other tools performing schedu-
lability analysis can be used such as cheddar[17].
V. CASE STUDY
As a preliminary experiment, we apply the approach to a
SCADA system case study.
A. Description
SCADA systems are meant to control processes through
local controllers, acquiring field data and returning them to
a SCADA master computer system. Fig. 5 shows a typical
SCADA system architecture. It consists of a SCADA master,
an operator workstation and a number of field devices con-
nected by a communication infra-structure. Field devices can
be Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), Remote Terminal
units (RTU), sensors and actuators.
Figure 5. A typical SCADA system architecture [18]
The SCADA master provides the operator with a Human-
Machine Interface (HMI) through a work station to issue
commands to PLCs and gather field data from them. PLCs are
digital computers programmed to continuously monitor sen-
sors and control actuators (e.g., valves, pumps, etc.). RTUs are
used for converting sensor data into digital data. As SCADA
systems cover large areas, they use Wide Area Networks
(WAN). SCADA systems provide the following features: data
acquisition and handling (e.g., polling data from controllers,
alarm handling, calculations, logging and archiving) on a set
of parameters, typically those they are connected to.
B. SCADA systems security
Several techniques can be used we can to enumerate threats
and thus derive the security requirements: attack trees, misuse
cases and misuse activities. Table III shows a list of some of
the risks targeting the assets for such SCADA systems [2].
For this case study, only the following requirements are
considered:
Assets Threats
SCADA master
Physical attacks
Malicious settings of the field units
Wrong commands sent to the field units
Malicious alteration of the parameters of the
SCADA master
Denial of service
Communication
Sniffing commands
Spoofing
Denial of service
PLC
Physical attacks
Malicious alteration of the run-time param-
eters
Incorrect commands sent to the central con-
troller
Malicious alarms sent to the central con-
troller
Denial of service
Table III
SCADA SYSTEMS THREATS
• Req.1. There should be mechanism for secure communi-
cation that guarantees data integrity, confidentiality and
authenticity.
• Req.2. There should be a mechanism that protects against
denial of service attacks at the level of the SCADA
master.
C. SCADA system architecture
Fig. 6 shows the input functional architecture together
with hardware platform. The functional model contains ten
functions in three transactions with their deadlines and trigger
periods. The hardware topology in the platform contains a
SCADA master and a PLC connected with Modbus. The
partitioning of functions into tasks and assignment of tasks
onto hosts is also showed. In addition the signal between “Set
point processing” and “Command computation” is mapped
onto a message. The execution budgets of the functions, the
assigned tasks and hosts are showed in Table IV. The values
of the SCADA function timing parameters are based on IEEE
1646 standard [19] specifying communication deadlines and
IEC 61850 [20] specifying communication network delays in
different information categories.
D. Identification of security pattern alternatives
After analyzing security requirements, the architect iden-
tifies a set of security patterns along with their refinement
alternatives, i.e., concrete patterns. It is important to note that
the selection of security patterns takes into account conflicts
due to inconsistencies between patterns. For example, Limited
view and Full view pattern are conflictual by nature so that
implementing both of them in a system will surely bring
inconsistencies. The search in the model-based repository
leads to the identification of two abstract patterns refined by
concrete ones:
• SecureComm pattern[2]: ensures that data passing across
a secure network is secure. It can be refined by two
Figure 6. Input functional architecture, hardware platform and deployment
Functions
Execution
time Task Host
Setpoint Processing 8.7 τ1 SCADA master
Poll Data 9.6
τ1, τ6,
τ7 SCADA master
Log Data 8.5 τ5 SCADA master
Check Status 9.6 τ6 SCADA master
Visualize Data 10.5 τ5 SCADA master
Alarm Handler 10.3 τ6 SCADA master
Archive Data 9.5 τ7 SCADA master
Command
Computation 10
τ2, τ3,
τ4 PLC
Data Preprocessing 9.5 τ3 PLC
Diagnosis 8.9 τ4 PLC
Table IV
TIMING PARAMETERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SCADA FUNCTIONS
patterns: SecureCommSSL (P1) and Secure-CommIPsec
(P2). SecureCommSSL uses X.509 certificates for au-
thentication and secure channel for creating a crypto-
graphic tunnel.
• Firewall pattern[2]: restricts access to internal networks
which can be refined by PacketFilter (P3) and Stateful-
Filtering (P4).
The result of this step is the System of security patterns
represented in Fig. 7.
Figure 7. System of security patterns
Fig. 8. shows the corresponding possible security solution
alternatives. Each system of security solution alternative con-
sists of a set of concrete patterns in dark grey.
Figure 8. Security solution alternatives generated from the pattern system
The timing and placement parameters of the used security
patterns are showed in Table V. The concrete patterns have
the same functions but have different execution times. The
timing parameters are based on a review of technical reports
of SSL/IPsec [21], and stateful/packet firewall [22]. One
important point is that the experiment has required some
effort in quantifying real-time parameters of security pattern
functions. Some functions execution times were estimations
and averages. For example, in SecureComm pattern function
“HMAC” does not have the same execution time as it depends
on the used algorithm (e.g., HMAC-SHA-1-96, HMAC-MD5).
However, we believe that estimations and averaging is enough
as the approach is meant for high level evaluation and archi-
tecture decision making. For example, if none of the security
solution alternatives respected the timing requirements because
of overload; the architecture of SCADA can be rethought
leading to adding an execution node.
Patterns Functions
Execution time
Task
(1) (2)
SecureCommSSL
(1) SecureCom-
mIPsec (2)
Authentication 9.7 38.7 τ1
Key
exchange
10.1 39.6 τ1
Encryption 9.9 9.9 τ1
HMAC 9.2 9.2 τ1
Decryption 10.3 10.3 τ2
Integrity
checking
10.2 10.2 τ2
PacketFiltering
(1) StatefulFilter-
ing (2)
Filtering 10 40 τ7
Table V
TIMING PARAMETERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SECURITY PATTERN
FUNCTIONS
E. Schedulability analysis of security pattern alternatives
The preliminary analysis consists in evaluating the place-
ment of SCADA and pattern functions on hosts described in
Table IV and Table V for each security solution alternative (1,
2, 3 and 4) in Fig. 8.
The left side of Fig. 9 shows the node utilization results
of each security solution alternative. The utilization bound
of the SCADA master and PLC are up to 75.68% (four
tasks) and 77.97% (three tasks) respectively. Security solution
alternatives 2 and 4 are rejected because the SCADA master
utilization in the two cases (83.33% and 103.33%) exceeds the
threshold. Response time analysis given in [8] is performed
from security solution alternatives 1 and 3 since they pass
the preliminary evaluation. Task response time is up to 280ms
in security solution alternative 3 and violates its deadline of
248ms. This is due to the offset added by task and the message
transmission time. All tasks of security solution alternative
1 respect their deadline: (150ms), (240ms), (60ms), (120ms),
(70ms), (100ms) and (30ms). From the evaluations, security
solution alternative 1 fulfils security requirements and respects
real-time constraints.
F. Discussion
From this first experimentation, we conclude that the ap-
proach fulfils the objective of finding a set of security patterns
respecting real-time constraints. The work has two main
contributions: (1) the proposal of abstract security pattern solu-
tions fulfilling security requirements and (2) the evaluation of
the possible implementations fulfilling real-time requirements
by the integration of possible security solution alternatives. In
this context, this work can be beneficial to resource constrained
embedded systems e.g., automotive, avionics. For instance in
EAST-ADL [23], trade-off analysis is performed for one de-
sign model with different parameters whose values determine
whether the design satisfies the model or not. Our work adds a
Figure 9. Node utilization for security solution alternatives 1, 2, 3 and 4, and tasks response times for alternatives 1 and 3
step forward which is the evaluation of different design alter-
native models against non-functional concerns (security in this
paper). This work can benefit from EAST-ADL in managing
security solution alternatives by using features diagrams. The
work can also use task optimization techniques such as the
one defined in [10].
VI. RELATED WORK
The evaluation of security solutions with regards to quality
attributes is not new. However the evaluation of the integrated
security solution with regards to the overall system archi-
tecture quality and performance is a fresh topic. This paper
contribution is a step towards this goal. It presents a model-
based method for evaluating security pattern-based solutions
for decision purposes. The evaluation was done in the context
of temporal evaluations. The evaluation results at each step
guide the architect to select the best possible alternative.
A. Security and Real-Time Requirements
Previous work have focused on the security and real-time
requirements separately: dependability and security modeling
and analysis[24][25] and real time requirements [26][27]. A
survey of dependability modeling and analysis frameworks
with UML can be found in [24]. It focuses on software systems
Reliability, Availability, Maintenance and Safety (RAMS). In
[25], the authors have extended MARTE with a Dependability
Analysis and Modeling (DAM) UML profile and applied it
to an intrusion-tolerant message service case study. In [26],
the authors presented a staged approach to optimize the
deployment in the context of real-time distributed systems.
B. Architecture Optimization, Decision and Trade-off Analysis
Other works focused on large scale architecture optimiza-
tion, decision and trade-off analysis [28][29][30][31]. In the
automotive domain, a multi-objective automatic optimization
approach based on EAST-ADL modeling is proposed [28]. It
supports the evaluation of alternative architectures according to
dependability, timing performance, cost etc. A similar work in
[29] presented a method for the search of optimal architecture
design according to multi-objectives such as cost, performance
and reliability based on SysML modeling. In [30], the authors
identified limitations in UML language to support architecture
decision according to non-functional attributes. They propose
a framework based on parametric analysis specification that
aims at evaluating design decisions. More specifically in
security and performance interplay, the study in [31] focused
on the analysis of the performance effects of security solutions
modeled as UML non-functional aspects. It used SPT UML
profile for annotating a UML design with schedulability, time
and performance data. The resulting model and the security
aspects were transformed separately and composed into one
model which is then analyzed.
VII. CONCLUSION
The paper presents a model-based approach for evaluating
security solution alternatives against real-time requirements.
The approach is applied to a SCADA system case study which
shows the applicability of the approach. The main benefits are
to provide a tooling support to allow early evaluation of differ-
ent implementation of security measures. This work is part of
a process devoted to incremental pattern-based modeling and a
safety and security analysis for correct by construction systems
design. The results obtained help the designer select appro-
priate design solution to reinforce security. The methodology
relies on UML/MARTE for modeling and makes extensive
use of MARTE to perform architectural evaluation for timing
concerns, this will be extended in the future to address other
concerns (e.g., cost, reliability, memory consumption, power
supply). The next step is to do such evaluation and use trade-
off analyses to decide between alternative pattern solutions.
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